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An Optimization Model for Technology
Adoption of Marginalized Smallholders
Deden Dinar Iskandar and Franz W. Gatzweiler
Abstract The rural poor are marginalized and restricted from access to markets,
public services and information, mainly due to poor connections to transport and
communication infrastructure. Despite these unfavorable conditions, agricultural tech-
nology investments are believed to unleash unused human and natural capital poten-
tials and eleviate poverty through productivity growth in agriculture. Based on the
concept of marginality, we develop a theoretical model which shows that these
expectations for productivity growth are conditional on human and natural capital
stocks and transaction costs. Policy recommendations for segment and location specific
investments are provided. Theoretical findings indicate that adjusting rural infrastruc-
ture and institutions to reduce transaction costs is amore preferable investment strategy
than adjusting agricultural technologies to marginalized production conditions.
Keywords Marginality • Infrastructure • Productivity growth • Human capital •
Transaction costs
Background
This paper seeks to provide the theoretical support for interventions to increase the
income-generating capacity of the rural farm households below the poverty line. In
particular, we observe the impact of technology adoption and the transaction cost
effects on the income generation capacity in specific segments of the rural poor.
There is a role for agricultural technology innovations in influencing the poor
directly by lifting constraints and increasing the output level of on-farm production
(Irz et al. 2001). An empirical study from Mendola (2007) also emphasizes the
potential role of technology in reducing poverty through the improvement of
smallholders’ production capacity.
In contrast to the economics of organization in which transaction costs are
defined as costs which occur “. . . when a good or service is transferred across a
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technologically separable interface.” (Williamson 1985, p. 1), this paper defines
transaction costs as the costs that create barriers between rural households and input
and output markets, and restrict market access, communication and interaction.
These costs mainly include transportation costs, due to the lack of well-
maintained roads, long distances between the rural households and the market,
and lack of affordable public transport facilities. Transaction costs also arise from
the poor communication infrastructure for accessing and exchanging information
regarding markets, products, and prices.
According to Reardon et al. (2001), insufficient access to public infrastructure
raises entry barriers to more profitable labor markets. Renkow et al. (2004) examine
the magnitude of fixed transaction costs that hamper the access to markets for
subsistence farmers in Kenya. They predict that the impact of high transaction costs
on the farmers’ income is equal to a tax of 15 %. Therefore, the impact of
infrastructure investment on farmers’ welfare is equivalent to cutting a tax of
identical size. A study by Stifel and Minten (2008) on transaction costs and poverty
in Madagascar finds that the incidence of rural poverty increases with increasing
remoteness, and the yields of major crops and the utilization of agricultural
production inputs fall significantly with the distance to the market.
Our study categorizes the rural farm households below the poverty line into four
segments (Fig. 5.1) according to labor and land endowments within the marginality
framework of von Braun and Gatzweiler (2014). The households in the first
segment are characterized by relatively higher labor capacity and land productivity.
The households in the second segment feature higher land productivity, but lower
labor capacity, while, contrastingly, the households in the fourth segment possess
lower land productivity and higher labor capacity. The third segment represents the
households under extreme poverty, with both low land productivity and low labor
capacity. In this study, these extremely poor households will be referred to as the
households under the survival line, since their main concern is to fulfill their basic
needs for survival.
Theoretical Analysis
The Optimization Problem for Rural Households
Under the Poverty Line
The income for a rural farm household is generated from the revenue of agricultural
production (on-farm activities) and the revenue of renting out factor inputs, mainly
labor, to off-farm activities. The rural farm household below the poverty line is
assumed to depend on two primary inputs for agricultural production: land and
labor. In addition to these main inputs, farm production also requires farming
production input, such as farming equipment, fertilizer and seeds. We assume
that the objective of the household is to maximize total household production
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from on- and off-farm activities. After the introduction of technology, the objective
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The income from on-farm activities is depicted by ( p.. Y ), where Y stands for the
aggregate output of farm activities and p is the respective market price. Farm
production is formulated as a Cobb-Douglas production function. Production output
is determined by the production inputs (Xi), where i represents different types of
input. Each input has a different elasticity, αi, that represents the percentage of
change in agricultural production output resulting from a 1 % change in the input i.
Fig. 5.1 The segmentation of rural farm households based on land and labor endowment
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The technology adopted also contributes to farm production. The technology used
in the production process is indicated by Vj, where j refers to different types of
technology. The productivity output elasticity of each technology, βi, indicates the
percentage change of farm output arising from a 1 % change in the adoption of
technology j. The production function is further characterized by ∂Y=∂Xα > 0ð Þ
and ∂Y=∂Vβ > 0
 
, meaning that production will increase with production input
and adopted technology. The revenue generated from off-farm activities is formu-
lated as w^ i  X^ i
 
, where (wˆi) and X^ i
 
represent the price and the volume of input
i used for other productive activities outside the farm household.
The total revenue of on-farm and off-farm activities should be adjusted by the
transaction costs, T. The transaction costs occur because of spatial marginality and
exclusion, specifically the difficulty of accessing the market because of the lack of
public infrastructure and access to market information. The actual revenue will be
discounted by transaction costs, since a certain proportion of household income
needs to be spent to reach the market for selling farm output and buying the
household’s production input.
The costs of generating the household income can be divided into production
costs and the costs of technology adoption. The production costs, ewi  eXi ,
indicate the costs of production inputs that are not available in the household. eXi
indicates the input i imported from outside the household, with ewi as its respective
price. The cost of adopting technology is formulated as cj  Vj
 
, where cj is the
price to adopt technology j. The presence of transaction costs (T ) will increase the
technology adoption costs, since the household has additional expenditures for
reaching the input or technology market.
Equation (5.2) indicates the resource constraint faced by the household. The
input i used for on-farm activities (Xi) and off-farm activities X^ i
 
is limited by the
availability of the total input i, which is composed of the household’s input
endowment Xi
 
and the input rented in from outside the household eXi . Equation
(5.3) is the budget constraint confronted by the household, which indicates that the
total costs of employing additional inputs and adopting technology should not
exceed the available production budget (B).
Given the input and budget constraints, the rural household maximizes the total
income by deciding on the optimal amount of choice variables. Those variables
include the amount of production input used for on-farm activities (Xi), the amount
of input used for off-farm activities X^ i
 
, the amount of additional input to be hired
from outside the household eXi , and the extent of adopted technology to be used
for on-farm activities (Vj).
The following Lagrangean equation formulates the maximum income function
for the household under the specified input and budget constraints:
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The Lagrange multipliers in Eq. (5.5), λ1 and λ2, measure the infinitesimal change in
the generated income resulting from infinitesimal changes in the constraints. In
the constrained optimization, λ1 and λ2 could be interpreted as marginal losses in the
generated income due to the reduction in the availability of inputs and budget,
respectively. These multipliers could also be interpreted differently as the marginal
income of the increase in the available inputs and household budget.
Taking the first derivative of the Lagrangean equation will give the marginal
income of each choice variable, i.e., change in the income generated by one unit

























 T  cj  1þ λ2ð Þ; ð5:8Þ
∂L
∂eXi ¼ λ1  1þ λ2ð Þ  T  ewi: ð5:9Þ
Setting Eqs. (5.6), (5.7), (5.8) and (5.9) equal to zero will give the First Order
Condition (FOC), the condition for the optimal level of each choice variable to
maximize the income. Rearranging Eq. (5.6) equal to zero in terms of (Xi) will give
the condition for the optimal level of input i as follows:
Xi ¼ p  αi





To generate the maximal income, the level of utilized input i should be equal to the
marginal income of the input and the extent of adopted technology, adjusted by the
transaction cost and the marginal income loss by reducing the input availability i to
the identical size as the employed input. The marginal income is determined by
p  αið Þ, the product of output price and input i elasticity. This optimal condition
implies that the utilization of input i in on-farm activities will increase with the output
price and the input elasticity i, and decrease with the transaction costs and the
marginal costs of losing the input availability to the same amount as the utilized input.
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Equation (5.10) suggests that the optimal allocation of the inputs towards
on-farm activities is determined by their elasticities. The higher the input elasticity,
the more intensive the respective input could be used in production. Let Ld stand for
land and Lb represent labor. The households in segment 2 with relatively higher
land productivity, but lower labor capacity, αLd > αLb, will make use of land more
intensively. On the other hand, the households in segment 4 with relatively lower
land productivity, but higher labor capacity, αLd < αLb, will rely more on the
utilization of labor to generate income from agricultural production. In segment
1, in which households have equally higher levels of land productivity and labor
capacity, and in segment 3, in which the households suffer from equally low levels
of land productivity and labor capacity, the contribution of labor and land utiliza-
tion to the generated income is evenly balanced, αLd ¼ αLb.
XLd








The optimal condition for the allocation of those two inputs (Ld and Lb) on
agricultural production is depicted in Eq. (5.11). When the households use two
inputs, they will exhaustively use one particular input that gives the highest return
(i.e., the input with higher elasticity) up to the point that the ratio of utilized input
and the resulting marginal income between the two inputs is equal.
We can infer from Eqs. (5.10) and (5.11) that the presence of transaction costs, T,
will reduce the optimal production input. Transaction costs discount the revenue
from agricultural production. When the transaction costs increase, the optimal input
for use in farm production will also decrease, since the actual revenue generated
from the utilization of input is declining.
The condition for the optimal level of exported input for off-farm activities is
given by the following equation:
1
T
 w^ i ¼ λ1: ð5:12Þ
The level of input used for off-farm activities will be optimal if the marginal revenue,
which is the price of the input i adjusted by transaction cost, is equal to the marginal
loss of generated income due to the reduction of input i availability. If the marginal
revenue earned from off-farm activities is higher than the marginal loss, the optimal
choice for farm households is to keep renting out the inputs. On the other hand, if the
marginal loss is higher than the expected marginal revenue from renting out the
inputs, then the rational household will keep the inputs for on-farm activities. In the
presence of a transaction cost, the revenue from off-farm activities will be discounted,
since the household will have additional costs to reach the input market.
Combining Eqs. (5.11) and (5.12) will link the decisions concerning allocation
of the input between on-farm and off-farm activities.
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Equation (5.13) indicates that increasing wages for off-farm work will decrease the
allocation of input i to on-farm activities. Assuming that the transaction costs
affects both the optimal input for use in on-farm and off-farm activities at the
same scale, the transaction cost will not influence the decision.









Equation (5.14) says that the level of adopted technology j, (Vj), will be optimal if it
is equalized to the marginal income of the adopted technology adjusted by the
transaction cost and marginal income loss due to reducing the budget at hand. The
marginal income is formulated as the product of output price and the elasticity of
adopted technology on the generated income p  βj
 
. The optimal level of adopted
technology will increase with the output price and the elasticity of technology j, and
decrease with the cost of obtaining the technology.
The contribution of technology to income generation does not work in isolation,
but is a joint action in which the utilization of production inputs also takes part.
Therefore, the condition for optimal adoption of technology is also influenced by
the elasticity of input i, /t. The optimal level of technology adoption and its
contribution to income generation will increase (decrease) with a higher (lower)
elasticity of the input production.
Equation (5.14) also indicates that the presence of transaction costs will reduce
the optimal level of technology adoption at a multifold scale. Transaction costs
hinder the adoption of technology in two ways: by discounting the actual revenue of
production output and increasing the actual cost of acquiring the technology.
Therefore, when the transaction costs and the price of technology are higher, it
will be a rational option for rural households to decrease the adopted level of
technology.
T  ewi ¼ λ1
1þ λ2ð Þ : ð5:15Þ
Equation (5.15) demonstrates the optimal condition for employing additional input
production from outside households. In this equation, λ1 represents the marginal
income from increasing the available input. The optimal level of additional input
iwill depend on the costs of acquiring the input i, the marginal income of increasing
the availability of input i, and the marginal costs of losing the available budget. The
households will start buying additional input i when the marginal income from
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increasing the input adjusted by the marginal cost of decreasing the current avail-
ability of the budget1 (as a consequence of the payment made to buy the input) are
higher than the price of input i ewið Þ adjusted by the transaction cost.
The Optimization Problem for Rural Households Under
the Survival Line
The extreme poor and marginalized rural households exist under worse conditions.
In our model, their capacities are constrained to fulfilling basic survival needs. The
budget constraint they live under restricts them from adopting agricultural technol-
ogies or buying additional inputs to increase production. Therefore, the constraints
in Eqs. (5.2) and (5.3) are changed into the following equations:
Xi þ X^ i  Xi; ð5:16Þ
Bp  _T ewi  eXi þ ci  Við Þ : ð5:17Þ
T˙ is the transaction cost confronted by the poorest households. We can expect
transaction costs to be higher for those households which are more marginalized,
therefore _T > T. Under the new constraints, the objective function for extremely
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From the equation above, it is obvious that the one option available to the very
poorest households is limited to choosing the level of inputs to use in on-farm
activities and renting out their labor for off-farm activities. The problem of optimal
input allocation for generating maximal income is different from the problem of the




p  Yið Þ þ w^ i  X^ i
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The first derivation of Eq. (5.19) results in the marginal income of each choice
variable,
1 Spending the input for off-farm activities will reduce the available input at hand. This particular
concept of cost covers the possibility that this reduction will create cost for the farmer’s income
generation.














 w^ i  λ1: ð5:21Þ
While the marginal income of renting out labor input for off-farm activities is
theoretically identical (Eqs. (5.7) and (5.21) are exactly the same), it can be deduced
from Eq. (5.20) that, as the extreme poor have fewer available inputs, the marginal
income from input utilization for the poorest households is lower than that of the
other households. That is reasonable, since the poorest households have not adopted
(modern) technology in their agricultural production, whereas the production out-
put is a joint result of all input utilization in interaction.
The conditions for the optimal level of input allocated for on-farm and off-farm
activities are given in the following equations:






 w^ i ¼ λ1: ð5:23Þ
Equation (5.22) suggests that the optimal input used in on-farm activities will
increase with output price and input elasticity, and decrease with transaction cost
and the marginal cost of increasing input availability. This optimization behavior is
equal to that of the less poor households, however, due to the absence of techno-
logical adoption, the optimal level of input utilization will be lower than the optimal
level of the less poor households.
The decision to rent out the input for off-farm activities is identical to the other
households (Eqs. (5.12) and (5.23) are identical). It depends onwages, transaction costs,
and marginal income loss by reducing the current availability of input to spend outside
the households. If the wage, after being adjusted by transaction costs, is higher than the
marginal income loss for accessing labormarkets, then the households will keep renting
out the input up to the point where the wage and the marginal loss are equal.
Combining Eqs. (5.22) and (5.23) will link the decisions about allocating the
input between on–farm and off-farm activities.




Equation (5.24) indicates that the increase in revenue by renting out input i to
off-farm activities (wˆ) will decrease the utilization of input i for agricultural
production on-farm. The amount of inputs i that the poorest households intend to
keep for on-farm activities is lower than that of the less poor households. Since the
marginal income of the input i is lower, the poorest households are willing to rent
out more input (labor) to generate household income.
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Theoretical Support for Government Intervention
From the theoretical analysis, we can infer that the income generation capacity of
rural households below the poverty line is determined by input elasticities, tech-
nology adoption level, and transaction costs. Particularly for the very poorest
households, special attention should be given to increasing their available house-
hold budget so as to enable them to adopt productivity-increasing technologies to an
extent that they would rather invest their labor on-farm than renting it out. Increas-
ing the income of poor rural households requires the improvement of input elastic-
ities and technology adoption, the reduction of transaction costs, and budget
injection for extremely poor households. For many of the poorest households, an
improvement in income elasticity and technology adoption could be a result of
improving rural infrastructures, market access and land rights, which would also
reduce transaction costs and improve proximity. However, if improving proximity
by adjusting rural infrastructure and reducing marginality is perceived as too costly,
a likely alternative for many rural poor will be to migrate to less marginal areas with
better proximity and better access to markets.
Budget Injection for Extremely Poor Rural Households
The extremely poor households are suffering from a lack of budgetary capacity to
support their production beyond survival levels. Therefore, one option for increas-
ing their income-generating capacity is cash transfers from the government. Cash
transfers have a direct increasing impact on the households’ budget availability,
moving the budget constraint from Eq. (5.3) to Eq. (5.17).
However, for the transfer to have a more permanent impact on sustainable
income generation, cash transfers need to be large enough to cover the household’s
basic consumption needs, so that the rest of the cash transfer may be used for
agricultural production, buying farming tools and seeds, and acquiring technology.
An example can be found in the 2005 cash transfer program in Zambia, which
shows that 29 % of the received cash transfer in the Kalomo district was invested in
either livestock or agricultural inputs after the consumption of basic needs was
satisfied (MCDSS and GTZ 2005).
The Improvement of Technology Adoption
We can see from Eq. (5.14) that the level of technology adoption is deterred by the
availability and cost of obtaining the respective technology. The availability of
technology and the cost of adoption could be defined as the function of government
expenditure on research and development.
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Vj ¼ f _Gj
 
; ð5:25Þ
cj ¼ f _Gj
 
: ð5:26Þ
G˙j is the government expenditure on research and development of agricultural
technology j. Vj represents the technology j available for adoption by rural farm
households, with cj as its respective price. The availability of technology j is
characterized by ∂Vj=∂ _Gj > 0, indicating that the availability of technology
increases as the government increases spending on research and development. On
the other hand, the cost of the adoption of technology j is featured with
∂cj=∂ _Gj < 0, meaning that the cost decreases with government expenditure on
research and development. If the government provides the subsidy for producing
technology, the availability of technology will increase at a lower price and the
level of adoption will increase.
However, the financial capacity of households to acquire the available technol-
ogy will be different between poor households living adjacent to the poverty line
and those who are extremely poor and living adjacent to or under the survival line.
Therefore, besides cash transfers, cheaper technology needs to be made available to
facilitate its adoption by the extremely poor households.
Improvement in Input Elasticities
Productivity improvements can also be achieved by improving input elasticity.
Elasticity of input i is assumed to be the function of government investment Ii,
which, in turn, is determined by government spending on that particular program,
€Gi.
αi ¼ f Iið Þ; ð5:27Þ
Ii ¼ g €Gi
 
: ð5:28Þ
Equations (5.27) and (5.28) are characterized by ∂αi=∂Iið Þ  ∂Ii=∂€Gi
 
> 0, indi-
cating that the elasticity of input i will increase with government spending . For
instance, to increase the elasticity of land, the corresponding government program
could be the provision of a better fertilizer funded by the government. Aside from
directly providing the fertilizer, the government could also support a program to
help the households make their own fertilizer. For example, the practical training
program conducted by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in
Northern Nigeria provides practical guidance on how to make compost heaps and
green manure for fertilizer (Onyemaobi 2012). The program now successfully
yields better harvests for the rural households.
On the other hand, the increase in labor elasticity could be facilitated through the
provision of training supported by the government. The role of the households’
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labor in agricultural production is not only limited to providing the work-force to
cultivate the crops, but also acting as decision-makers and applying good agricul-
tural practice. To succeed in farming, rural households need more training beyond
basic literacy. They need training regarding the right crops to plant, the type and
quantity of required inputs, and the methods for utilizing limited resources with
greater efficiency. Better skill and knowledge will lead to higher return on labor
employment in agricultural production.
Another example is a training program conducted by the UNDP in Northern
Nigeria providing a practical demonstration on better farming techniques
(Onyemaobi 2012). Other examples for increasing the farming skill of rural house-
holds are the farmer field schools. The season-long programs enable the farmers to
meet regularly and learn new agricultural techniques. According to Davis
et al. (2010), the farmer field schools have resulted in important improvements in
farmer productivity. In particular, this approach is beneficial for poor farmers with a
low level of primary education.
To produce effective results, the program should be targeted to address the right
problems. For example, the households with lower land productivity call for
provision of better and safer fertilizer. On the other hand, the households with
relatively lower labor capacity require practical training to increase their skills and
knowledge. These ways, the optimal condition, as indicated by Eq. (5.11), could be
reached. Improving the education and skill of the farmer does not only enhance
labor elasticity, but also increases technology absorption capacity. More educated
and skilled smallholders will have a better capacity to adopt specific technologies
and make use of them for accelerating income generation.
Reduction of Transaction Costs
Transaction costs result from the lack of public physical and institutional infra-
structure and are a barrier to accessing the market. The difficulty in accessing the
market impedes the opportunities to generate income. It reduces the market oppor-
tunity for agricultural products, decreases the returns to labor and land of on-farm
activities, and increases the input costs, as well as the costs of adopting technology.
It also reduces the opportunity of rural households to participate in labor markets
for off-farm activities. Transaction cost, T, can be formulated as the function of
government expenditure on public infrastructure, G,
T ¼ f G : ð5:29Þ
The equation above is characterized by∂T=∂G < 0, meaning that transaction costs
will decrease with increasing government spending on public infrastructure. In the
case of the poor households under the survival line, Eq. (5.29) is slightly modified
into _T ¼ f G , where _T > T.
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Increasing the provision of public infrastructure will increase the actual revenue
of agricultural production and off-farm activities, as well as lessen the cost of
production, thus enhancing opportunities for generating income from agriculture.
Public investment in transportation and communication infrastructure are particu-
larly important as attempts to reduce transaction costs.
Access to public infrastructure leads to a reduction in those transaction costs,
which the poor rural households have to carry when they access the output and input
markets. Lower transaction costs could change the structure of relative prices for
the poor farmer. This change will enable poor households to earn higher revenue
from agricultural production and lower production cost, thus increasing their
income. Lower transaction costs also allow the poor farm households to acquire
the necessary additional inputs and technology; hence, they encourage the improve-
ment in agricultural production that leads to higher agricultural output.
Finally, lower transaction costs may induce a change in the allocation of labor
input between on-farm and off-farm activities. When rural households commit to
more than one income-generating activity, the access to public infrastructure will
influence the households’ labor allocation decisions. The reduction in transaction
cost due to the availability of public infrastructure will increase opportunities for
poor rural households to participate in off-farm activities. On the other hand, lower
transaction costs and improved public infrastructure, and the subsequent proximity
and access to markets, may change labor allocation decisions to on-farm activities.
Conclusions
The theoretical optimization model for decision-making of marginalized small-
holders on which we have elaborated assumes rational decision-makers. The
likelihood of poor and extremely poor smallholders making decisions as elaborated
in this optimization model correlate directly to the extent that these smallholders act
rationally. This study provides theoretical evidence for increasing the income
generation capacity of rural farm households below the poverty line by means of
government interventions linked to the agricultural production process, like condi-
tional cash transfers and improvements in institutional infrastructure. Particular
concern should be given to the reduction of transaction costs, since high transaction
costs reduce the revenue from on-farm as well as off-farm activities and increase
the cost of using additional production inputs and adopting innovative technologies.
Technology adoption, which has been advocated as one of the most promising ways
to enhance the agricultural production capacity of the poor, is not as effective for
productivity growth under the presence of high transaction costs. That is particu-
larly relevant to marginalized smallholders. The provision of public infrastructure
and improved institutions would lead to a reduction in transaction cost and increase
income opportunities for poor rural households.
Segmentation of poor households provides differentiated recommendations for
intervention strategies. For instance, the extremely poor households living under
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the survival line need more provision of infrastructure to overcome access barriers
and cheaper technology than the poor households adjacent to the poverty line.
Investments to increase input productivity also varies between different segments.
Assuming that the households are rational, they will use those productive inputs
which promise the highest return on income and thereby intensify production.
Therefore, the government should invest to increase input productivity, so that
their income generation capacity is increased.
Investments in technology in segments of rural society in which there is
insufficient absorption capacity reduces the returns on technology investment,
even if the technology is adjusted to the specific agro-ecological conditions.
Productivity growth cannot be achieved in those segments, because the deprecia-
tion of human and social capital is larger than the investments in said capital.
Improving the institutional infrastructure and reducing transaction costs by improv-
ing education and information and securing property rights would decrease societal
depreciation, improve absorption capacities and make investments in technological
innovations economically worthwhile.
From a broader agricultural development perspective, there is a trade-off
between adjusting agricultural technologies to the marginalized production condi-
tions of poor and extremely poor segments of rural society versus adjusting rural
infrastructure and institutions to allow for the economically effective use of agri-
cultural technologies. Theoretical findings indicate that adjusting rural infrastruc-
ture and institutions to reduce transaction cost is more preferable. However, it has
become obvious that institutional and technological innovations need to go hand-in-
hand. Therefore, both strategies need to be further informed by a spatially-specific
approach.
Given the overall goal of productivity growth in agriculture, areas in which
agricultural infrastructure is fragmented and marginalized will require investment
in adjusting the technology to the locality. If these investments are not made, rural
populations will most likely move to urban areas and both human and agro-
ecological potentials will be lost. In areas in which agricultural infrastructure is
less fragmented and marginalized, the use of agricultural technology which allows
for the grasping of scale effects is economically advisable.
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